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Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice
Massimo Morelli, Huanxing Yang, and Lixin Ye
Abstract
In an economy where agents have di¤erent productivities and mobility, we compare a unied
nonlinear optimal taxation with the equilibrium taxation that would be chosen by two competing
tax authorities if the same economy were divided into two States. The overall level of progressivity
and redistribution is unambiguously lower under competitive taxation; the richare always in
favor of competing authorities, whereas the poor are always in favor of unied taxation; the
preferences of the middle class depend on the initial conditions in terms of the distribution of
abilities, the relative power of the various classes, and mobility costs.
Keywords: Competitive nonlinear taxation, Mobility, Integration, Inequality, Type preferences
over institutions.
JEL: D30, D82, H21, H77
The constitutional choice of which taxation regimeto select (centralized versus decentralized,
State taxes versus City taxes, European taxes versus national taxes etc.) may a¤ect the location
decision and distribution of disposable income of consumers and producers, and may in turn be
a¤ected by the perceived mobility and by the initial conditions in terms of relative power of the
various classes. In the case of the European Union, the increased mobility of citizens and the recent
expansion of the Union have e¤ects on the taxation systems of the various States, and in turn the new
Massimo Morelli: Columbia University and European University Institute. 720 International A¤airs Bldg., 420 W.
118th St., New York, NY 10027. mm3331@columbia.edu. Huanxing Yang: The Ohio State University. 448 Arps Hall,
1945 N. High St., Columbus, OH 43210. yang.1041@osu.edu. Lixin Ye: The Ohio State University. 449A Arps Hall,
1945 N. High St., Columbus, OH 43210. ye.45@osu.edu. We thank Daron Acemoglu, Stefania Albanesi, Francesco
Caselli, Steve Coate, Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Dennis Epple, Bernard Salanie, John Weymark, and participants in
the political economy and theory workshops at Princeton University, London School of Economics, UC Santa Barbara,
University of Hong Kong, Peking University, Ohio State University, University of West Ontario, and at various meetings
for very helpful comments and suggestions on the early versions of our paper. We also thank three anonymous referees
for their insightful comments which greatly helped us improve our analysis and exposition. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
conditions in terms of distribution of incomes and classes a¤ect the likelihood of further integration
steps.
We are used to thinking that the level of progressivity of a tax system is mainly a political
choice, reecting the ideology and the preferences of the class(es) holding power.1 On the other
hand, we are used to thinking of the institutional choice State versus Federal taxes,City versus
State taxes,or property taxes versus centralized funding of schoolsas mainly due to e¢ ciency or
freedom to choose considerations. This paper challenges the view that this issues can be separated,
demonstrating that even if taxes are always chosen optimallyon the basis of standard utilitarian
criteria, a centralized taxation system leads to higher progressivity for any distribution of types and
preferences.
In order to compare the e¤ects and the origins of centralized versus decentralized taxation sys-
tems, we consider a framework in which two States compete for di¤erent agents (citizens, workers,
or consumers) along two dimensions. The vertical dimension captures the agents heterogeneity
in terms of their innate abilities or productivities. The horizontal dimension captures the agents
heterogeneity in terms of their abilities to move from one State to the other, or equivalently, their
location preferences, reecting their tastes for di¤erent cultures, landscapes, food, political systems,
weather conditions, etc.
Under a unied taxation system, the Federations objective is to choose an optimal tax schedule
to maximize a weighted average of all the citizensutilities. Under the independent taxation system,
each States objective is to choose a tax schedule to maximize the weighted average utility of all the
citizens choosing to live in the State, given the other Statestax schedules. At the constitutional
stage, the representatives of the various types or classes of citizens evaluate the two regimes on the
basis of the solutions of these maximization programs.
In our main model we consider the case in which agents have three vertical types, type H
(the rich), type M (the middle class), and type L (the poor).2 Under the independent authority
regime, a taxation authority has to take into account not only the resource constraints and incentive
compatibility constraints of a standard optimal taxation designer, but also the additional individual
rationality constraint derived from location preferences. In this independent taxation regime the
1Taxation is called progressive when the average tax rate (not necessarily the marginal rate) increases with income.
2For robustness check, we have also worked out a continuous type model. The full analysis is reported in the online
appendix.
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tax for the high type is lower and the subsidy for the low type is lower accordingly. Moreover,
we show that under the independent regime the total output and consumption are higher, but the
total welfare is lower, regardless of the preferences of the middle class. Intuitively, with competition
each independent tax authority tries to attract more high type citizen-workers (so as to raise its tax
revenue to subsidize the low type). This competition e¤ect reduces the tax to the high type, which
also means that the subsidy to the low type decreases accordingly. Finally, we show that under
independent taxation bunching is less likely to occur, implying that under independent taxation
there might be more tax brackets. The main reason for this result is that the incentive compatibility
constraints are relaxed under independent taxation due to competition for high types.
At the constitutional stage, the collective choice between independent and centralized taxation
would be trivial if we assumed a Rawlsian veil of ignorance: behind a veil of ignorance, in fact,
there would be unanimous support for a centralized taxation system. In reality we observe plenty of
decentralization choices, and this may be an indication that in most realistic constitutional stages in
history the collective decision is made by agents that representvarious classes, in frontof the
veil of ignorance. There is variation of course about the procedures and voting rules with which such
delegates decide on the institution that will govern future government decision making, but here we
assume simple majority.3 The representatives of the interests of low productivity types (the poor)
should always be in favor of a unied taxation regime. On the other hand, the representatives of the
high productivity types (the rich) should prefer the independent regime. Hence the constitutional
choice between the two regimes can always be thought of as determined by the preferences of the
middle class (excluding the trivial cases in which one of the two extreme types has the absolute
majority at the constitutional stage). Even though a unied regime always yields higher welfare, we
can show that a country with better initial conditions (higher average productivity) may end up with
lower welfare because the majority decision can favor decentralization at the constitutional stage.
One of our clearest ndings is that, as mobility increases, it becomes increasingly likely that the
decisive middle class will prefer to have (or to switch to) a unied system. The intuition for this
robust result is as follows: under any taxation regime the middle class benetsfrom the presence of
richer citizens who pay more taxes (or even pay them indirectly a transfer) and su¤erfrom having
to support the poor through the tax system; under a unied system these two contrasting e¤ects do
not depend on mobility costs, but in the independent system they do: as mobility costs go down,
competition for the rich reduces the benetsmentioned above, while the need to support the poor
3See Barbera and Jackson (2004) for an interesting perspective on the consistent selection of majority rules.
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remains roughly unchanged, hence the previously indi¤erent middle type likes the unied system
more in relative terms. Our computations also show that the greater the size of the middle class, the
more likely it is that the preferences of such a decisive class will be in favor of independent taxation,
as the support of the poor is more spread out. Finally, our computations show that the larger the
population of the poor, the more likely that the middle type will prefer independent taxation, as the
fear to support the poor increases.
The choice to adopt or not a new constitution with more integrated scal policy in the European
Union, where preferences for such a potential reform are likely to be a¤ected by self interest consid-
erations by the citizens who would be asked to ratify it, is the constitutional choice problem that
best ts our framework, and where our analysis o¤ers some important interpretations. As barriers
to labor mobility fall and mobility costs go down, a rst e¤ect based on our analysis is a reduction in
redistribution if independent taxation systems remain; but the second e¤ect from our analysis is to
make the median type more and more likely to prefer the unied system, hence the downward trend
of progressivity could at some point be reversed by a spontaneous constitutional reform towards a
unied government. However, expansion to include more poor countries shifts those preferences of
the median type back, away from unication of scal policy. So the expansion decision is something
that favors the rich, because they eliminate for the near future the possibility that the median voter
will require a unication of scal policy in Europe.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the literature on optimal income taxation with
mobile labor and competition. A general view from this literature is that the ability of individuals to
move from one jurisdiction to another imposes additional constraints on the amount of redistribution
that each jurisdiction can undertake (see, for example, Wilson, 1980, 1992; Bhagwati and Hamada,
1982; Mirrlees, 1982; Leite-Monteiro, 1997; Hindriks, 1999; and Osmundsen, 1999). More recently,
Wilson (2006), Krause (2009), and Simula and Trannoy (2010) study how allowing agent migration
a¤ects the optimal nonlinear income tax schedule of a State, taking the other Statestax schedules
as exogenous outside options.4 Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) provide a general equilibrium analysis
of tax competition among a large number of small countries. They consider two skilled types and
4 In particular, Simula and Trannoy (2010) show that mobility signicantly alters the closed-economy results, as a
curse of the middle-skilled agents is identied: the marginal tax rate is negative at the top, and the average tax
rate is decreasing near the top. In our model, by endogenizing the outside option, we show that such a curseof the
middle-type agents disappears.
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that only one type can move.
To the best of our knowledge, Piaser (2007), Brett and Weymark (2008), and Gordon and Cullen
(2010) are the only papers that model the strategic interaction between tax authorities as we do.
Piaser (2007) analyzes competitive nonlinear taxation between two governments with two types of
workers. In order to analyze the e¤ect of competition on the progressivity of income taxes and say
something about the relationship between constitutional choice and the degree of inequality, it is
necessary to have at least three types, which we do in our model. The analysis with three types
involves problems that do not arise with two types, as will be claried below.
Brett and Weymark (2008) analyze strategic nonlinear tax competition between two governments
with a nite number of types of agents. Unlike in our model, they assume perfect mobility so agents
are only di¤erentiated along the vertical dimension. They show that there do not exist equilibria
in which either the highest type pay positive taxes, or the lowest type receive positive subsidies,
which is an illustration of the race-to-the-bottomproposition in the context of tax competition
with perfect mobility. This result is consistent with ours when the mobility cost parameter k ! 0.
Gordon and Cullen (2010) also model a Nash game in (nonlinear) tax schedules between states,
but a key di¤erence is that in their analysis, the states and federal government both engage in income
redistribution.5 Since the federal government is also active when states set their tax policies, there
exist vertical tax externalitiesin the sense that higher taxes at the state level tend to reduce tax
revenue collected at the federal level. As a result, it is possible for state governments to redistribute
too much income in equilibrium. In fact, the most interesting result in Gordon and Cullen is that
with the presence of a federal government, the combined tax systems of the two levels of government
can exhibit too much income redistribution. Given this, the federal government will in equilibrium
focus on correcting for any deviations between the redistribution already done by the states and
the overall amount of redistribution desired by the federal level. Given that our objective in this
research is to compare unied and competitive taxation with varying mobility costs, we ignore this
kind of vertical externalities by assuming that redistribution occurs at only one level of government.
In a sense Gordon and Cullen follow a more positive approach while we follow a more normative
approach.
The e¤ect of mobility and competition on progressivity has also been analyzed in contexts other
than income taxation. For example, it is well established that capital tax competition leads to
lower taxes and lower e¢ ciency when tax revenue is used for public good provision, in contrast
5A similar approach is taken by Boadway et al. (1998), who consider linear income taxation only.
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with the Tiebout hypothesis.6 The most related paper to ours in the literature on capital tax
competition is perhaps the recent one by Hateld and Padro i Miquel (2008), because they too study
the preferences of di¤erent citizens for the di¤erent levels of decentralization of taxes. They model
both the constitutional stage and the tax implementation stage as a median voters choice, whereas
in our view the constitutional choice is the only one that makes sense to relate to voterspreferences
directly. The choice of a tax schedule in a given system is instead an outcome of political competition,
which leads, under standard probabilistic voting assumptions,7 to a policy outcome that is equivalent
to the solution of an average utility maximization problem.
The connection between mobility and redistribution of income was studied in Epple and Romer
(1991) in the context of local property taxes. Basically they develop a general equilibrium frame-
work in which the population of each local jurisdiction is endogenously determined. Tax rates and
redistribution levels are chosen by majority vote of local residents. Voters anticipate changes in
housing prices and migration that will occur in response to changes in the local tax rate and level of
redistribution.
In terms of modeling and technical issues, our paper is most closely related to Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002), who study competitive nonlinear pricing with both
vertically and horizontally di¤erentiated agents.8 Our analysis di¤ers from theirs in two main features
at the technical level: rst, we need to take into account the additional resource constraint; second,
given our focus on the preference of the middle class, we need to solve a three-type model for
the unied and decentralized system, which calls for additional care in dealing with the incentive
compatibility constraints.
The paper is organized as follows. We lay out the model with three ability types in Section
I. In Sections II we analyze the unied and independent taxation and then compare two taxation
regimes. In Section III we discuss constitutional choice over two taxation regimes. Section IV
provides concluding remarks with some discussion of the restrictions of our analysis. The missing
proofs in the text can be found in the Appendix.
6See Wilson (1999) for a survey. The famous Tiebout hypothesis, in favor of independent policy-making with perfect
mobility, was expressed in Tiebout (1956). A standard reference for the rst opposing view is Oates (1977). See also
Huber (1999).
7See e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
8Also see Yang and Ye (2008) for a similar framework allowing for partial market coverage along vertical dimension.
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I The Model
Citizens (or workers/consumers) are characterized by identical preferences and di¤erent abilities
(i.e., marginal productivities). Given consumption (or after-tax income) C and labor supply l, the
preferences can be represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
(1) U(C; l) = u(C)  l
where u() is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously di¤erentiable.9 Let Q denote
the total product or before-tax income, then C = Q T (Q), where T () is the tax schedule set by the
tax authority. A citizens ability is denoted by , which captures the (constant) marginal productivity.
We assume that the labor market is competitive, and the wages are bid up to the marginal
productivities of workers, which implies that Q = l. The utility function (1) can be rewritten as
follows:
(2) U(C;Q; ) = u(C) Q=
We consider three ability types: type H (the rich), type M (the middle type), and type L (the
poor), with abilities H , M and L, respectively (H > M > L). In the online appendix, we
extend our analysis to the case with a continuum of ability types.
We consider two States in a potential Federation the minimal situation in which we can compare
the progressivity of competitive State taxation versus that of a unied Federal tax.10 Each State
i, i = 1; 2, has a total measure (population) of 1 original citizens attached to it. The State that a
citizen is initially attached to is called her home State. Citizens can move from their home state to
the other state. The cost of moving is given by (1   x)k, where x denotes a locational preference
9We assume that preferences are quasi-linear in labor. There is a tradition of using such preferences, see, for
example, Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Rochet (1987), and Boadway et al. (2000). Some more recent work has tended
to opt for preferences that are quasi-linear in consumption (e.g., Diamond, 1998, Saez, 2001, and Salanie, 2003).
We have tried both utility specications. For the discrete type model, the qualitative results are the same. But for
the continuous type model, with quasi-linearity in consumption the di¤erential equation system characterizing the
equilibrium under independent taxation becomes too complicated, which makes it hard to compare with the solution
under unied taxation. For tractability we thus follow the more traditional approach, assuming that the preferences
are quasi-linear in labor.
10Our analysis would apply unchanged to two cities whose provinces or counties together constitute a State, hence
comparing the properties of centralized State level taxation against decentralized city level taxation.
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which is individual specic, x 2 [0; 1], and k is a common factor a¤ecting the moving cost for all
the citizens. More specically, x measures the degree of exibility of a citizen: the smaller is x,
the larger is the moving cost, or the greater the attachment to the home State.11 On the other
hand, the smaller k, the smaller is the moving cost (given x), or the more intense the competition
between the two States, as people put less weight on their locational preferences. While x represents
a personal cost in adjusting to life in a new State, k can be interpreted as some common component
of adjustment cost.
We assume that k is a (strictly) positive constant that is commonly known, but neither the
ability  nor the locational preference parameter x is observable to the tax authority. Thus a
citizen is characterized by a two-dimensional private type (; x). Using the jargon in the industrial
organization literature,  can be regarded as the vertical type, while x can be regarded as the
horizontal type in a Hotelling-type model (so that a citizen with a smaller x can be regarded as
being located closer to the base of her home State).
We denote the corresponding proportions of the three types by H , M and L, respectively, and
we assume that x is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1].12
Each State i decides on a tax schedule Ti(Q). Given (T1(), T2()), workers choose their State of
residence and then Q, to maximize u(Q T (Q)) Q=. The single crossing property holds only along
the vertical dimension, with the consequence that the tax authorities can only design tax schedules
to sort agents along that dimension.
In the environment of competitive mechanism design, it is not without loss of generality to restrict
attention to direct contracts (see e.g. Martimort and Stole, 1997, and Peck, 1997). To sidestep this
problem, we restrict attention to deterministic tax schedules, allowing to consider direct contracts of
the form fT1(); T2()g2fH ;M ;Lg.13 For brevity of exposition, from now on we will often refer to
vertical types as simply the types, especially when there is no confusion in the context.
Instead of choosing tax schedules of the form Ti(), each State may equivalently be assumed to
11The citizen with x = 0 is the least mobile, while the citizen with x = 1 is the most mobile.
12Assuming some other distributions would not alter our main results, as we focus on symmetric equilibria in which
no citizens move. However, doing so would necessarily complicate our equilibrium analysis.
13See Rochet and Stole (2002) for a discussion on the restrictions resulting from focusing on deterministic contracts.
More general approaches to restore the without loss of generality implication of the revelation principle in the
environment of competitive nonlinear pricing have been proposed and developed by, for example, Epstein and Peters
(1999), Peters (2001), Martimort and Stole (2002), and Page and Monteiro (2003).
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choose direct contracts of the form (Qi(); Ci()), i = 1; 2.14 Since everyone is required to participate
in one of the tax systems, the individual rationality constraint only concerns which State to live in.
Let vi  u(Ci)   Qi=i be the rent provision to type-i citizen who accepts contract (Qi; Ci) from
her home State i, i 2 fH;M;Lg: Suppose the other States taxation rule leads to rent provisions vi
for this type-i citizen. Then this citizen with a horizontal type x will stay with her home State if
and only if
(3) vi > vi   k (1  x) , i 2 fH;M;Lg
It is well known that if the menu of contracts, (Qi(); Ci()) ; i = 1; 2, satisfy the self-selection
constraint (3), then it can be supported by an anonymous income tax schedule (see, for example,
Guesnerie and Seade, 1982). For this reason we can think of each tax authority as choosing a tax
schedule Ti(Q) or, equivalently, as directly choosing a menu of contracts of the form (Qi(); Ci()) ;
i = 1; 2, for its residents, subject to the self-selection constraints. In what follows, we assume that
the tax authority directly chooses the menu of contracts (Q(); C()),  2 fH ; M ; Lg.15
Formally, under the independent taxation regime, the time line is as follows. In period t = 1,
each State chooses its menu of contract of the form fCi(); Qi()g; i = 1; 2, simultaneously and
independently. In period t = 2, given (fCi(); Qi()g), i = 1; 2, citizens decide on the location
and the labor supply (or equivalently, the contract (C;Q) to accept). In period t = 3, production
(or pre-tax income) is realized and consumption is determined (or equivalently, taxes are collected)
according to the menu of contracts pre-announced at t = 1.
The tax authorities are benevolent. They share the same social preferences over the utility space,
represented by the welfare function W (UH ; UM ; UL), where Ui = u(Ci) Qi=i, the utility per capita
of type i who accepts a contract (Ci; Qi), i = H;M;L. The tax authority maximizes a weighted
utilitarian social welfare function, with the weights being the proportions of the three ability types.16
Thus each tax authoritys objective is to maximize the following welfare function:
(4) W (UH ; UM ; UL) = HUH + MUM + LUL:
14The (direct) tax schedule can be recovered from Ti() = Qi()  Ci().
15See e.g. Weymark (1986a, b) and Brett and Weymark (2008) for related papers that follow the same approach.
16The weighted utilitarian social welfare can be regarded as a linear approximation of a general quasiconcave social
welfare function at the initial utility levels (Weymark, 1987). We choose the weights to be the proportions of the three
ability types because the treatment of each class should intuitively reect its relative size.
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In e¤ect we assume that the tax authority in each state maximizes the welfare of the residents
living in the state at the time the tax policy is under consideration. We thus ignore the complication
that the total measure of residents relevant to future tax policy decisions is a¤ected by the current
decisions. Alternatively, moving costs could be included in the objective function so that the welfare
depends on the horizontal market shares (i.e., the horizontal measure of citizens for each ability
type). We do not follow that approach due to the following considerations. First, should we include
the horizontal market shares in the welfare function, then by simply attracting more high type
workers, the total welfare will increase even if the utility per capita for each type remains unchanged,
which is an undesirable feature. Second, the weights used in a social choice function are usually
exogenously given. If we include the endogenously determined horizontal market shares in the
weights, our analysis can easily become intractable.17 Also note that although horizontal market
shares do not enter the objective functions, competing for higher type workers along the horizontal
dimension is still important, as redistribution is the only purpose of taxation in our model, and hence
the tax authority always has an incentive to attract more richto subsidize the poorto improve
the (weighted) welfare.
As the citizensutilities and the resulting market shares for the two States are functions of the
menu of contracts o¤ered (or the tax schedules), we can focus on the analysis of stage 1 alone. This
can be done by replacing stages 2 and 3 with the corresponding payo¤s as functions of the o¤ered
menu of contracts. An equilibrium in our model is characterized by the pair of menus of con-
tracts f(C1(); Q1()); (C2(); Q2())g2fH ;M ;Lg: given (C i(); Q i()), (Ci(); Qi()) maximizes
the welfare function (4) among the workers who choose to reside in its State subject to the usual
incentive compatibility and resource constraints, i = 1; 2.18
17 In that case we may even need to worry about the existence of a perfect sorting equilibrium. Suppose a perfect
sorting equilibrium exists. Then a State may want to deviate by choosing T (L) = Q(L) trying to get rid of all the
poor: by maximizing taxes on the poor like this, the State is basically forcing all the poor to move to the other State,
and hence increasing the total (or average) utility (including the moving costs) of its residents. But this cannot be
sustainable, as the other State can react the same way, leaving the existence of a perfect sorting equilibrium in question.
However, when individuals are heterogeneous only with respect to their attachment to home states (the vertical ability
types are all the same), the non-existence problem mentioned above does not arise and it is feasible to include moving
costs in the objective functions, see, for example, Mansoorian and Myers (1993, 1997).
18Note that our equilibrium solution concept has an undesirable feature in our setting, as when State 1 changes its
menu of contracts (tax schedule) State 2s resource constraint may be violated due to the induced migration ows
to or from State 2. So the tax schedule of State 2 may not be sustainable. This issue is similar to the well known
feature of Rothschild-Stiglitz type Nash equilibrium, where the constraint of having nonnegative prot for one rm can
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This completes the description of the model with independent taxation. For the model of unied
taxation, all the modeling elements are the same as in the independent taxation model, except that
the two tax schedules are now designed by a Federal authority, whose objective is to maximize the
welfare function (4) for all the citizens living in the Federation.
As a benchmark, in an autarkic economy without taxes (Q = C), the optimal consumption C()
is characterized by
(5) u0(C) = 1=:
The optimal consumption or before-tax income does not depend on x in autarky, and each citizen
should live in her own home State. Moreover, it is easily veried that C() is strictly increasing in
.
II Unied Taxation versus Independent Taxation
We will start with an analysis of the unied taxation, followed by an analysis of the independent
taxation. We will then compare these two taxation regimes and discuss the constitutional choice
by augmenting our above model with a constitutional stage (t = 0), where the taxation regime is
decided by simple majority rule.
A Unied Taxation
Under unied taxation, we solve for the tax schedule that maximizes the weighted utility of the
citizens in the Federation. Since the two States are identical in terms of the original composition
of the population, we focus on the symmetric solution in which each State o¤ers the same menu of
contracts and the resulting market sharesare symmetric.19
be easily violated following an o¤-equilibrium deviation by the other rm (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Note that
imposing the restriction that State 2s resource constraint be satised after State 1 changes its menu of contracts will
be inconsistent with the notion of Nash equilibrium, as such a restriction requires that State 1 correctly anticipate a
resource-balancing response by State 2. With our solution concept so dened, we implicitly require that the resource
constraint be satised only on equilibrium path. The same solution concept in competitive taxation setting is also
adopted in Piarser (2007), Brett and Weymark (2008), and Gordon and Cullen (2010).
19We focus on the symmetric solution here for ease of comparison with the independent case, where we will focus on
symmetric equilibrium in which each State o¤ers the same menu of contracts. While a formal proof is not attempted
here, we conjecture that the symmetric solution is optimal for the Federation.
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subject to the binding resource constraint
H(QH   CH) + M (QM   CM ) + L(QL   CL) = 0; (RC)
and the incentive compatibility (IC) constraints, which basically require that no type has incentive
to mimic any of the other types. With three types there will be 6 inequality conditions: for any





The above problem is essentially a standard optimal taxation problem with discrete types. In such
problems, it is well known that the IC constraints can be simplied as a monotonicity constraint
QH  QM  QL plus (two) binding local DICs. The proof of the following lemma can be found in
Weymark (1986a,b, 1987).
Lemma 1 The set of IC constraints under unied taxation is equivalent to the monotonicity con-












We will solve the relaxed program by ignoring the monotonicity constraint (we shall do the
consistency check after we have obtained the solutions). For the Lagrangian let the multipliers of
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First of all, it is clear that the solution does not depend on k, the mobility parameter, as a direct
consequence of our focus on symmetric solution. Second, it can be veried that u0(CUM ) > 1=M and








L (due to the concavity of u()). Thus compared to
the autarky case, there is no distortion of consumption for type H, but the consumptions of type M






H , type M and type
H never pool in the optimal solution.
Lemma 2 In the optimal solution under unied taxation, TUH > T
U
M > TUL .
Proof: Suppose TH  TM . That is, QH   CH  QM   CM . By the binding DIC-H,
u(CH)  u(CM ) = QH  QM
H




 u(CM )  CM
H
:
But this contradicts the fact that CH = argmaxCfu(C)   CH g (u0(CH) = 1=H) and CM < CH .
Therefore, we must have TH > TM . Similarly, suppose TM < TL, that is, QM  CM < QL CL. By
the binding DIC-M,











By the properties of u(C), the function u(C)  CM is strictly concave, which means that u(C)  CM




contradiction. Thus we must have TM > TL.
Given TH > TM > TL,20 by (RC) we must have TH > 0: if TH  0, then by the lemma both TM
and TL are strictly negative, and (RC) will be violated. Similarly, we must have TL < 0. The sign of
TM is ambiguous and depends on parameter values. So under a unied regime, while the rich always
pay taxes and the poor receive subsidies, the middle class may pay taxes or receive subsidies.
So far we have ignored the monotonicity constraint. When the monotonicity constraint fails,
bunching may occur.21 Given that type M and type H never pool in the optimal solution, we only
need to check whether CUL  CUM , or equivalently, whether u0(CUL )  u0(CUM ). From the previous
analysis, we have
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Therefore, if (8) is satised, then there is no bunching in the optimal solution. Observing (8), we
can see that bunching will not occur if the high and middle types abilities are not too di¤erent
(M=H is not too low) and the proportion of high type, H , is not too large. If (8) is violated,
then bunching can occur. In the bunching case, denote CUML and Q
U
ML to be the consumption and





































20Similar results regarding the ordering of tax payments can be found in Matthews and Moore (1987) and Brito et
al. (1990).
21Weymark (1986b) provides a detailed analysis of the possibility of bunching in a one-country model.
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With bunching, the resource constraint can be written as HTH + (M + L)TML = 0. By slightly
modifying the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that TH > 0 > TML.
Note that the output, Qi, should be nonnegative. With the explicit requirement that outputs
are nonnegative, in a continuous type model Seade (1977) shows that it might be optimal for the
lowest types to produce zero outputs. Since incorporating the nonnegativity constraint of output
would complicate the analysis without adding much additional insight, it is typically ignored in the
optimal taxation literature (e.g., Lollivier and Rochet,1983, and Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984). In
our model, by the binding resource constraint and the two DICs, QL can be expressed as:
QL = HfCH M [u(CM ) u(CL)] H [u(CH) u(CM )]g+MfCM  M [u(CM ) u(CL)]g+LCL
If the ability of the low type, l, is high enough relative to those of higher types, or if the proportion
of the low type, l, is relatively large, then the nonnegativity constraint of output will not bind.
B Independent Taxation
Under the independent taxation regime, each State chooses its taxation schedule simultaneously and
independently to maximize the weighted utility of the classes of citizens residing in its own State,
given the other States taxation schedule. Given that the two States are identical, we focus on
symmetric equilibria in which both States choose the same taxation schedule.
We follow the same notation dened earlier to let vi  u(Ci)   Qi=i be the rent provision to
type-i citizen who accepts contract (Qi; Ci) from her home State i, i 2 fH;M;Lg; and vi be the
corresponding rent provision to this type-i citizen from the other State. Then by the self selection










When vi  vi , all the type-i citizens in the State in question will stay with their home State, and
all the types (i; x) where x  1  (vi   vi ) =k in the other State will move to the State in question.
Therefore for vertical type j , the total measure of horizontal types that will reside in the State in
question will be 1+ (vi   vi ) =k.22 For this reason, xi dened below can be regarded as the market
shareof type i, i 2 fH;M;Lg; for the State in question:




22This expression also applies when vj < vj .
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The States objective is to maximize HvH + MvM + LvL, subject to the appropriate resource
constraint and the incentive compatibility constraints. The resource constraint is given by
HxH(QH   CH) + MxM (QM   CM ) + LxL(QL   CL) = 0;
where xis are given by (9).
It turns out that the IC constraints under independent taxation are much more involved than in
the unied taxation case.
Like in the rst two steps in the proof of Lemma 1, the six ICs (6) can be reduced to four local
ICs (DICHM , DICML, UICMH , and UICLM ) plus the monotonicity constraint QH  QM  QL.
We then argue that UICs cannot bind so these two constraints can be dropped. Given each
States objective function, each State has incentive to redistribute as much as possible.23 But this is
restricted by the DICs. With independent taxation, each State tries to steal the high types from the
other State. The purpose of this move is not to attract high types per se, but to increase its total
tax revenue from high types. Given that redistribution is only restricted by DICs, UICs should not
bind in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Under independent taxation, the UICs are inactive.
Given that UICs can be dropped, each State has the following programming problem:
maxHvH + MvM + LvL
u(CH)  QH
H
 u(CM )  QM
H




HxH(QH   CH) + MxM (QM   CM ) + LxL(QL   CL) = 0
QH  QM  QL
where xis are given by (9).
Unlike in the unied taxation case, under independent taxation the DICs may not bind simul-
taneously.24 One or both DICs may not bind since two States are competing for higher type agents
23 In the complete information benchmark, it is easily seen that given the concavity of the utility function, the solution
would have only the high type working, redistributing income to the other types.
24The argument showing that the DICs must bind under unied taxation does not work here. To see this, suppose in
a candidate symmetric equilibrium DIC(H) does not bind. Now if State 1 increases QH and decreases QM by the same
amount, this might lead to budget decit for State 1, as some H type will move to State 2 and some M type will move
to State 1. Under unied taxation, the central authority can change the tax schedules of two States simultaneously,
but this is not feasible under independent taxation.
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under independent taxation. The rent provision for H type now depends on two forces: competition
in the horizontal dimension and self-selection (sorting) in the vertical dimension. If competition is
strong on the horizontal dimension, then H type will secure high rent anyway, which makes sorting in
the vertical dimension automatically satised and the DICs not binding. Hence we need to consider
multiple cases.
1. Both DICs bind. Let H and M be the multipliers of DIC-H and DIC-M, respectively, and let
R be the multiplier of RC. We rst derive the rst order conditions, then impose symmetry.




































0(CH) + Hu0(CH) + HR







0(CM )  Hu0(CM ) + Mu0(CM ) + MR














From the above equations, we obtain








































L   IM + LIRTL=k
As in the unied taxation case, it can be veried that u0(CM ) > 1=M , and u0(CL) > 1=L.
Therefore, compared to the autarky case there is no distortion at the top, but the consumptions
of typeM and type L are both distorted downward. Moreover, following exactly the arguments
paralleling those in the proof of Lemma 2, we have T IH > T
I
M  T IL. As a result, T IH > 0, T IL < 0
and the sign of T IM is ambiguous.
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TH = kM (H   M ) + kL(H   L);
TM = TH   k(H   M ); TL = TM   k(M   L):
Clearly, consumption is no longer distorted: CIj = C

j , j = L;M;H. Moreover, TH > TM >























From the above inequalities we can see that if k is small enough, the di¤erence between TH
and TM and that between TM and TL will be small. So, the DICs will not bind when k is
su¢ ciently small. In the limit as k ! 0, TH , TM and TL all go to zero. This is consistent
with Brett and Weymark (2008), who show in a model with perfectly mobile agents (that is,
k = 0 in our model), that there does not exist any equilibrium in which the highest type pays
positive taxes, or the lowest type receives positive subsidies under competitive taxation.
3. One DIC binds and the other does not. Here we only consider the case when DIC-H is slack
but DIC-M binds (the analysis for the other case is similar). In this case, we have H = 0 and











That is, there is no consumption distortion for types H and M , but the consumption of type
L is distorted downward.26 The expressions for M , R and u0(CIL) are the same as those in
(10). In this case, we have TH > TM > TL.
Note that bunching can only occur when both DICs bind. When at least one DIC does not bind,
from previous analysis we have u0(CIL) > u
0(CIM ), which implies that the monotonicity constraint
25So Cjs are the same as in the autarky case, though Qjs are di¤erent.
26 In the opposite case that DIC-M binds and DIC-H is slack, we can show that both CIH and C
I
L have no distortion
but CIM is distorted downward.
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CM > CL is satised. If bunching between type M and L does occur when both DICs bind, the
programming problem becomes:





HxH(QH   CH) + (MxM + LxL)(QML   CML) = 0
Following the proof of Lemma 2, we can show that T IH > 0 > T
I
ML. Moreover, the solution to the
above problem becomes:






























L + M   IH + (M + L)IRTML=k
To summarize, we have the following lemma regarding the monotonicity of taxes.
Lemma 4 In the symmetric equilibrium under independent taxation, T IH > T
I
M  T IL.
So as in the unied taxation case, in the equilibrium of the competitive taxation regime, the
rich pay taxes, and the poor receive subsidies. The middle class, however, may pay taxes or receive
subsidies. We now turn to the comparisons of the two taxation systems.
C Comparison
Our rst comparison result shows that bunching is more likely to occur under unied taxation.
Proposition 1 If bunching does not occur under unied taxation, then bunching does not occur
under independent taxation.
Proof: Given that under independent taxation bunching only occurs when both DICs bind, we only
need to show that if bunching does not occur under unied taxation, bunching will not occur under
independent taxation when both DICs bind. Under unied taxation, the condition that ensures no
bunching is given by (8):
(11) L
U




When both DICs bind under independent taxation, the no-bunching condition u0(CIL) > u
0(CIM )
can be written as:
(12) L
I














Given that T IM  T IL, to show that (11) implies (12), it is su¢ cient to show that IH  UH and
IM  UM .
We rst prove that IR < 
U






































where the rst inequality is due to TL < 0, the rst equality is due to the binding resource constraint,
and the last inequality is due to TH > 0. Therefore, IR < 
U




R and TH > 0,
we can immediately see that IH  UH by comparing the expressions. Similarly, IM  UM follows
the fact that IR < 
U
R and TL < 0:
It is easy to construct examples such that bunching occurs under unied taxation but does not
occur under independent taxation. For instance, we can pick the parameter values such that the no-
bunching condition under unied taxation (8) is violated, but k is small enough such that the DICs
do not bind. Proposition 1 implies that bunching is more likely to occur under unied taxation. An
empirical implication of this result is that there might be more tax brackets under the independent
taxation regime.
Our second comparison result shows that competition increases consumption for both the middle
class and the poor (while the consumption stays the same or undistorted for the rich).






M : competition increases consumption for both types M and
L.
Although the consumption for the rich stays the same (undistorted), the induced output or
income Q is di¤erent under di¤erent taxation regimes. Competition always increases consumption
for both types M and L, regardless of whether bunching occurs or not, and regardless of whether
it occurs under unied taxation alone or under both taxation regimes. Next we turn to the welfare
comparisons. The rich pay less taxes under competitive taxation, and should always prefer the
independent taxation.
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H . That is, type H pays lower taxes and is better o¤ under
independent taxation.
On the contrary, the poor receives lower subsidy under competitive taxation, and should always
prefer a unied taxation system.






L . That is, type L receives less subsidies and is worse o¤
under independent taxation.
The results derived in the above propositions are quite intuitive. Under independent taxation,
each state tries to attract more high types to increase its tax revenue so that it can redistribute more
to low types. This competition for high types leads to lower taxes for high types and lower subsidies
to low types.27 Thus, high types are better o¤ and low types are worse o¤ under independent
taxation. Since higher types will get higher utilities due to the competition (for higher types)
under independent taxation, the IC constraints are more relaxed under independent taxation. As
a result, the downward consumption distortion for the lower types, which are created to satisfy the
IC constraints, are reduced with independent taxation.28 Moreover, more relaxed IC constraints
means that the monotonicity constraint will be more likely to hold, which reduces the possibility of
bunching.






i2fH;M;Lg are also feasible under
unied taxation, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Equilibrium welfare is always greater under unied taxation than under independent
taxation.
Even if the unied taxation system is welfare superior, it is clear that if the taxation system is
chosen by majority rule at the constitutional stage, and if i < 1=2 for i = H;L, then the independent
27Another way to understand this is as follows. The tax base of each state depends both on individualslabor supply
choice and the number of individuals in the State. Under unied taxation, the tax base is elastic only along the labor
supply margin, while under indepednent taxation it is elastic along both margins. Therefore, the tax base of each state
is more elastic under independent taxation; and as a result, less tax can be collected and less redistribution can be
made. We thank one referee for suggesting this interpretation.
28The result that independent taxation reduces the consumption of the low types but increases their before-tax income
even more has something to do with the quasilinear-in-leisure preferences. Weymark (1987) provides a discussion of a
similar phenomenon in a comparative statics analysis regarding welfare weights in a one-country model.
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taxation regime can be chosen if and only if it yields higher equilibrium utility for the middle class
(given that the rich always prefer the independent taxation system and the poor always prefer the
unied taxation system). It is impossible to obtain general analytical results on the preferences of
the middle type as a function of relative productivities (distribution of s) and income distribution
(distribution of s). However, the computations we now turn to, provide interesting results.29
III Constitutional Choice
We now augment our model with a constitutional stage (stage 0), where the taxation regime is
decided by simple majority rule. That is, a taxation system (unied or independent) is chosen as
long as more than 50% of citizens are in favor of that taxation system. We assume that i < 1=2 for
i = H;L. So the constitutional choice will be determined by the preference of the middle class.
Fix H = 2 and L = 1 for all the numerical computations in this section. Our computations
rst show, for any percentage of each type, that
Result 1 There exists a cuto¤ M 2 (L; H) such that type M prefers the independent taxation
system if and only if her type is higher than M .
Our computation reveals that the utility di¤erences between two taxation regimes for types H
and L are both monotonic in k. More specically, vIH vUH is positive and decreasing in k, and vIL vUL
is negative and increasing in k: as k increases, the di¤erence between two regimes diminishes, and
the utility di¤erence between two regimes also become smaller. For the middle type, the schedule
of vIM   vUM is in general non-monotonic in k (though it is monotonically increasing over (:5; 1:5]).
But the whole schedule is higher when M is higher, which also gives rise to Result 1 above. Our
computations also show that given M 2 (1; 2) and H = L = (1  M )=2: 30
Result 2 There exists a cuto¤ M such that type M prefers the independent taxation regime if and
only if M > 

M .
Intuitively, as M or M increases, type Ms interest aligns more with that of type H.
These results have an important implication in terms of welfare. Assume H = 2; L = 1 and
M = 1:51. We can compute M by keeping H = L. We can then compare the welfare of a
29Detailed computations and Matlab code used in this project are available upon request.
30When M increases, we let H and L go down by the same compensating amount.
22
Federation with M    with that of a competitive taxation regime obtained with M + . Even
though the average  is higher in the second case, welfare is higher in the former Federation, for 
su¢ ciently small (by Corollary 1 above). This means that
Corollary 2 A country with better initial conditions (higher productivity, or higher average 
here) may end up with lower welfare because of a suboptimal constitutional choice due to majority
decision making at the constitutional stage.
Another interesting observation comes from the following exercise: x M and M (or L); then
our computations show that
Result 3 There exists L such that type M prefers independent taxation if and only if L > 

L.
This is very intuitive: as the percentage of the poor goes up, the fear for having to support the
poor increases and the middle type becomes more likely to prefer the independent tax regime.
Our computations also reveal some less intuitive relationships between initial conditions and
constitutional preferences by the middle type:
Result 4 Both M and M are decreasing in k.
This suggests that when k decreases, for a given M or M , the middle type is more likely to
prefer the unied taxation system. The schedules M (k) and M (k) are shown in Figure 1 below,
where M (k) is plotted under the parameter values H = M = L = 1=3, and M (k) is plotted by
keeping H = L, and M = 1:3.
31























31Our computations show that the higher the selected value for M , the lower the schedule of M (k). This is
consistent with our Results 1 and 2.
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Figure 1: Schedules of M (k) and M (k)
An intuition for Result 4 is as follows: under both taxation regimes, the middle class benets
from the existence of richer citizens who pay more taxes and su¤ersfrom the existence of poorer
citizens who need to receive subsidies; under unied taxation these two e¤ects do not depend on k,
while under independent taxation when k goes down the benetsmentioned above go down, since
the rich secures higher rents as the competition between two States becomes more intense. Given
that there is no such competition e¤ect for the poor, the relative attractiveness of the two regimes
to the middle class must therefore change in the direction of a more likely preference for the unied
system. The intuition for the monotonicity of M (k) is similar: when k goes down, the previously
indi¤erent type between the two systems should prefer the unied regime, and indi¤erence can be
restored if the middle class is larger, to compensate in terms of per capita share of the transfers to
the poor.
In a picture with M on horizontal axis and 

M on vertical axis, our computations show that:
Result 5 M decreases as M increases (while the other two types decrease symmetrically at the
same time).
Figure 2 below is plotted with k = 1. Increasing M in this way reduces inequality but also reduces
total productivity when M < 1:5. If M is less than the mean, the reduced total productivity makes
the fear of being milked by the poor increase even if there are less poor agents, because that
reduction is perfectly o¤set by an equal reduction in the number of rich.32
32The pattern between M and M is a fortiori decreasing when the increase in M is balanced by a reduction in H
only, without touching the percentage of the poor. Type M is more worried about being milked by the poor, which
leads to a lower cuto¤ of M .
24














Figure 2: Schedule of M (M )
It is di¢ cult to design a comparative statics exercise in the three type model to isolate the
e¤ect of inequality, since, as shown above, any change in the productivity distribution has also other
confounding e¤ects. We are able to say something clearer about the role of initial inequality when
studying the case of a continuum of ability types (the online appendix).
In summary, weaker horizontal preferences (lower k) would push towards unication of scal
policy in the region, but the middle class is likely to go for that only if the poor are not too poor
and not too many, or if there is a su¢ ciently large fraction of high income earners.
This set of results ts our intuition about the situation within the European Union, where
mobility sharply increased in the 90s and things seemed at some point mature for a new European
Constitution that would concentrate a larger fraction of policy decisions in Brussels, but such a
preference for unication of policy making has reversed itself after the enlargement of the Union to
include a set of poorer countries that have altered the distribution of income in the Union in the
opposite direction.33
33The decisions about taxation reforms may well depend on the voting system in the Union: in fact, if two rich
countries accept a third poorer country in the Union, perhaps for reasons of economies of scale in a larger market, the
popular votewould be more likely than earlier to be in favor of unied tax system; but a majority in each State, if
required, would be more di¢ cult than before to materialize, since the median voters of the two richer countries would
be against supporting also the poor people of the new country added to the Union. All these issues are for future
research and applications of the ideas in this paper.
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IV Concluding Remarks
This paper has extended the analysis of optimal income taxation to the case in which strategic
authorities compete for heterogeneous citizens, and where the heterogeneity is in productivity as well
as mobility characteristics. Every agents productivity and ability to move are private information
and we have explored the relative importance of these two dimensions for the degree of progressivity
of the tax system, comparing the competitive nonlinear taxation game with the unied optimal
taxation benchmark of Mirrlees (1971). Moreover, the model has allowed us to discuss the incentives
of di¤erent classes of agents to advocate for di¤erent systems at the constitutional stage.
The independent taxation system yields lower progressivity than the unied case. Under compe-
tition the rich are better o¤ and the poor are worse o¤, and whether the middle type is better o¤
or worse o¤ depends on mobility and on the distribution of income. In particular, we have shown
that the middle type is more likely to choose the unied system when the mobility level is high (k
is smaller), or when the proportion of the poor is not too large. Our analysis of the continuous type
model (in an online Appendix) conrms most of the main ndings from our three type model, and
provides some additional insights for this competitive nonlinear taxation framework.
An important direction for future research is the consideration of asymmetric initial conditions.
Tracing the impact of di¤erent initial conditions on constitutional choice would also permit a dynamic
analysis of persistence of inequality di¤erences across countries due to the di¤erent institutions that
have di¤erent feedbacks on inequality. Our model suggests that countries with less inequality may
choose independent regimes, but independent regimes do not reduce inequality as much as a unied
system does. Hence a static model cannot su¢ ce to analyze the important relationship between
inequality, redistribution, and institutions.
In our analysis, we assume that vertical types are independent of horizontal types. It would be
reasonable to assume that higher (richer) types have lower moving costs, as in Simula and Trannoy
(2010). However, we do not expect that allowing this correlation would change our results qualita-
tively. In that case, under independent taxation the competition for the high type would be more
erce. As a result, the high types would still be better o¤ and the lower types would still be worse
o¤.
Another restriction in our analysis is that we did not consider exogenous revenue requirements
(or public good provision), thus redistribution is the only purpose of taxation, unlike in, for example,
Boadway et al. (2000) and Stähler (2002). Nevertheless, we do not expect that incorporating an
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exogenous revenue requirement would change our main results qualitatively. The only change we
expect is that under both taxation regimes the amount of redistribution will become smaller, as the
aggregate tax must be positive in that case.
Finally, one feature of our current analysis is that the constitutional choice is made by the
median voter, while the States are weighted utilitarian once the constitution has been chosen. If
one considered the (fully normative) alternative in which at the constitutional stage institutions are
chosen in a welfare-maximizing manner, then clearly the centralized taxation regime would always
be chosen (regardless of type distributions or mobility costs). On the other hand, if one considered
the opposite (fully positive) alternative in which the taxation policy is chosen based on direct voting,
then there would be a technical question regarding how to o¤er alternatives of tax schedules to voters
to choose from. This technical issue, together with the coexistence of centralized and decentralized
taxation regimes in the real world, suggest that neither of the above alternative assumptions, albeit
consistent, can be completely satisfactory. Even though the assumptions we have made for the
two stages may appear somewhat inconsistent, this current research represents a rst attempt to
bridge constitutional choice and taxation design in a way that aims to shed light on when we should
expect to see one system or the other. In a sense we have provided a benchmark where citizens
compare institutions under the most benevolent assumptions about their functioning. In future work,
more realistic political economy models of the di¤erent regimes could replace our optimal taxation
framework, and their equilibrium outcomes (and consequent constitutional choice incentives) will be
usefully contrasted with the benchmark we established here.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3: We illustrate this point by considering the following case. Suppose in equi-
librium UIC binds for both M and L types (the proofs for the cases that only one UIC binds are
similar). In this case, one can show that CL is not distorted, but both CM and CH are distorted
upwards (CL < CM  CH). The binding UICs imply that


















The rst inequality above follows from the upward distortion of both CM and CH , which implies that
u(C)   CM is a decreasing function of C in the region under consideration. The second inequality
follows as CH  CM > CL = CL. Given that TH  TM < TL, by the resource constraint we
have TH < 0 and TL > 0. Now we construct a protable deviation for one State. Suppose State 1
decreases TM by ", decreases TL by " and increases TH by "M=H (" > 0 but small). Note that












































































The inequalities are based on TH < 0 and TL > 0. Therefore, the new tax schedule is feasible for



























Therefore, it constitutes a protable deviation for State 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given the possibility of bunching and the possibility that DICs might
not bind under independent taxation, we have several cases to consider.
1. No bunching under unied taxation. Since no bunching under unied taxation implies no
bunching under independent taxation, we have the following subcases to consider.
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Dene operation  such that A  B means that B has the same sign as A. Then





























































































 (TH   TL)H
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+ (TM   TL)M
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clearly have u0(CUL ) > u
0(CIL) and u
0(CUM ) > u
0(CIM ).
(c) DIC-H is slack but DIC-M binds under independent taxation. Given that CIM = C

M , we
clearly have u0(CUM ) > u
0(CIM ). The proof for u
0(CUL ) > u
0(CIL) is exactly the same as
that in subcase 1(a), as the expressions for M , R and u0(CIL) are exactly the same under
both cases.
2. There is bunching under unied taxation.
(a) No bunching and both DICs bind under independent taxation. It is su¢ cient to show
that u0(CUML) > u
0(CIL). Since in Subcase 1(a) we have shown that u
0(CUL ) > u
0(CIL), it
is su¢ cient to show that u0(CUML)  u0(CUL ). The condition u0(CUML)  u0(CUL ) can be









But given that the no bunching condition (8) is violated, the above condition is satised.














Where the second inequality uses the binding resource constraint: HTH+(M+L)TML =













































Note that we used the fact that TML < 0 and the binding resource constraint along the
way.
(c) At least one DIC does not bind under independent taxation. Recall that there is no bunch-
ing under independent taxation. The proof follows closely those of previous subcases.
Proof of Proposition 3: Given the possibility of bunching and the possibility that DICs may not
bind under independent taxation, we have several cases to consider.
1. No bunching under unied taxation. Since no bunching under unied taxation implies no
bunching under independent taxation, we have the following subcases to consider.
(a) Both DICs bind under independent taxation. By RC, DIC-H, and DIC-M, we have
QH = HCH + MCM + (1  H)H [u(CH)  u(CM )]
+L[CL + M (u(CM )  u(CL))](13)
Dene Qi = QIi  QUi , Ci = CIi  CUi , and u(Ci) = u(CIi ) u(CUi ) where i = H;M;L.
We have CH = 0. In addition, CM > 0 and CL > 0 by Proposition 2. Then from
(13), we have
(14) QH = MCM + LCL   [(1  H)H   LM ]u(CM )  LMu(CL)
By the concavity of u(), we have u(Ci)  u0(CIi )Ci. We thus have
QH  MCM + LCL   [(1  H)H   LM ]u0(CIM )CM   LMu0(CIL)CL















CL < 0 = CH(15)
Thus T IH < T
U










(b) Neither DIC binds under independent taxation. The equation (13) still holds under unied
taxation. By the nonbinding DICs, under independent taxation, the LHS is strictly less
than RHS in (13). As a result, the LHS is strictly less than RHS in (14). The rest of
the proof is the same as in the previous subcase, except that in (15) the rst inequality is
replaced by a strict inequality, and the second inequality is replaced by an equality.
(c) DIC-H is slack but DIC-M binds under independent taxation. The proof is a combination
of subcases 1(a) and 1b.
2. There is bunching under unied taxation.
(a) Both DICs bind and there is no bunching under independent taxation.










ML, equation (13) still holds (though can be
simplied further) under unied taxation. The rest of the proof follows exactly that of
subcase 1(a).





















ML, equation (13) still
holds (though can be simplied further) under both taxation regimes. The rest of the
proof follows exactly that of subcase 1(a).
(c) At least one DIC does not bind under independent taxation. The proof follows exactly
that of subcases 1(b) and 1(c), with slight modications of notation.
Proof of Proposition 4:
1. No bunching under unied taxation.
(a) Both DICs bind under independent taxation. First, we show that T IL > T
U
L . Suppose
T IL  TUL . Then QIL  QUL  CIL   CUL .
vIL   vUL = u(CIL)  u(CUL ) 
QIL  QUL
L
 u(CIL)  u(CUL ) 
CIL   CUL
L
= u0( eC)(CIL   CUL )  CIL   CULL > 0:
The rst inequality is due to the fact that QIL   QUL  CIL   CUL . The second equality
follows from the intermediate value theorem, where eC 2 CUL ; CIL. The last inequality
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holds since u0( eC)  u0(CIL) > 1=L and CIL > CUL . Thus we have vIL > vUL . Next we
compare vIM and v
U
M . By the binding DIC-M, we have
vIM   vUM = u(CIM )  u(CUM ) 
QIM  QUM
M
= u(CIL)  u(CUL ) 
QIL  QUL
M
 u(CIL)  u(CUL ) 
CIL   CUL
M
= u0( eC)(CIL   CUL )  CIL   CULM > 0;(16)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that u0( eC)  u0(CIL) > 1=L > 1=M . Thus
vIM > v
U








H , we have
vIH > v
U








all the constraints under unied taxation, thus it is a feasible solution as well. However,
the fact that vIj > v
U






are the optimal solution for unied taxation. Therefore, we must
have 0 > T IL > T
U













Next we show that vIL < v
U
L . Suppose v
I
L  vUL . This implies that
vIM   vUM = u(CIM )  u(CUM ) 
QIM  QUM
M
= u(CIL)  u(CUL ) 
QIL  QUL
M
> u(CIL)  u(CUL ) 
QIL  QUL
L
= vIL   vUL  0:(17)
















. Therefore, we must have vIL < v
U
L .
(b) Neither DIC binds under independent taxation. The proof is very similar to that for
subcase 1(a). We rst show T IL > T
U
L . Suppose in negation T
I
L  TUL . Then following the
same steps above, we can obtain the expressions for vIL vUL and vIM  vUM (now the second
equality in (16) should be replaced by a strict inequality, due to the strict inequality of
DIC-M). Again the same contradiction can be reached. To show vIL < v
U
L , we follow
similar steps as before. The only change in the proof is that the second equality in (17)
should be replaced by a strict inequality.
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(c) DIC-H is slack but DIC-M binds under independent taxation. Given that DIC-M binds,
the proof is exactly the same as in subcase 1(a).
2. There is bunching under unied taxation.
(a) Both DICs bind and there is no bunching under independent taxation. The proof is
similar to that in subcase 1(a). The proof that T IL  TUL implies vIL > vUL is exactly the
same. The proof that T IL  TUL implies vIM > vUM still goes through. This is because with
bunching DIC-M (and UIC-M) binds under unied taxation. By the same logic, the proof
that vIL  vUL leads to vIM   vUM  0 holds as well.
(b) Both DICs bind and there is bunching under independent taxation. The proof is similar
to (and simpler than) that in subcase 1(a). The proof that T IL  TUL implies vIL > vUL
is exactly the same, while that T IL  TUL implies vIM > vUM and that vIL  vUL leads
to vIM   vUM  0 follow immediately as types M and L are pooled together under both
taxation regimes.
(c) At least one DIC does not bind under independent taxation. The proof follows exactly
that of subcases 1(b) and 1(c), with slight modications of notation.
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